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Abstract
In this paper we provide a framework for how the traditional life and pension contracts
with a guaranteed rate of return can be optimized to increase customers’ welfare. Given
that the contracts have to be priced correctly, we use individuals’ preferences to find the
preferred design. Assuming CRRA utility, we cannot explain the existence of any form of
guarantees. Through numerical solutions we quantify the difference (measured in security
equivalents) to the preferred Merton solution of direct investments in a fixed proportion
of risky and risk free assets. The largest welfare loss seems to come from the fact that
guarantees are effective by the end of each year, not only by the expiry of the contract.
However, the demand for products with guarantees may be explained through behavioral
models accounting for loss aversion, e.g. cumulative prospect theory. In this case, the
optimal design seems to be a simple contract with a life-time guarantee.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we combine previous work on valuation on life and pension insurance products
with well-developed theories on individuals’ preferences in order to optimize customers’ util-
ity. We analyze the welfare effects of different components of pension insurance contracts,
including annual guarantees. We find that contracts that are closest to a linear payout func-
tion give highest welfare. The annual guarantee seems to move away from linearity and hence
lower the customers’ welfare. Finally, we show that a behavioral model accounting for loss
aversion may explain the existence of some form of guarantee. A simple model with life-time
guarantee seems to work best in this case.
Our paper contributes to the field of household finance, defined by Campbell (2006) as
how households use financial instruments to attain their objectives. Assuming that all prices
are correct, i.e. that companies do not make profit nor losses, we define a class of contracts,
from which the customer can choose. Based on a set of preferences, the customer will then
select his optimal contract. We assume that the customers’ preferences can be described using
the von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) framework of expected utility. Furthermore, we
use the conventional constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) as our main representation of
preferences.
From the Borch (1962) condition we know that any utility function within the broader
class of hyperbolic absolute risk aversion(HARA) utility function (including CRRA) induces
linear sharing rules, meaning that each individual will get a fixed proportion of total wealth
in any state of the economy. In our case, any kind of guarantee will inevitably lead to the
customer receiving a higher proportion of total wealth in the states where the guarantee is
effective. According to Borch, such a non-linear sharing rule will not be optimal.
However, it is likely that actual behavior will not coincide with the standard theories on
optimal behavior as described above. As Campbell (2006) writes, ”household finance poses
a particular challenge to this agenda, because many households seek advice from financial
planners and other experts, and some households make decisions that are hard to reconcile
with this advice or with any standard model. One response to this is to maintain the hope
that actual and ideal behavior coincide, but to consider non-standard behavioral models of
preferences incorporating phenomena such as loss aversion and mental accounting.” We al-
ternatively explain the existence of guaranteed pension products by introducing behavioral
models. We show that both a behavioral model within the expected utility framework (util-
ity function with loss aversion) and outside, cumulative prospect theory (CPT), rationalize
guaranteed features of the contract. We focus on CPT, initiated by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), since this model is the most developed and thoroughly investigated.
The main function of most modern life and pension insurance contracts is that of a savings
product, distributing financial market risk between customers and shareholders of the life
insurance company. Despite the fact that there are no international standard contracts, a
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number of common properties determine the risk sharing function, e.g. asset allocation,
guaranteed interest rate, the profit sharing and the capital structure of the company.
Proportion of stocks in portfolio versus available buffers in % of customer reserve. Sources: Quarterly reports
and analyst presentations.
Figure 1: Quarterly development of the asset allocation of Norwegian life insurers - 1999-2005.
Companies in the same market tend to follow each other closely when it comes to as-
set allocation (see figure 1). Companies diverging from the ”market standards” risk losing
customers if their bet does not work as planned, while the upside is more limited. We use
the conventional method of fixing asset allocation at the start of the contract (as used e.g.
by Grosen and Jørgensen (2000), Hansen and Miltersen (2002), and Miltersen and Persson
(2003)), but one could also consider more general versions, allowing for time-dependent, but
deterministic allocations, or even allocations being a function of some stochastic process.1
Guaranteed rates of return are normally defined in pension contracts as an annual prop-
erty. Companies are obliged to grant a guaranteed amount in one year, and bonuses given
cannot be recalled and used as guaranteed return. However, as we will describe later, we also
show a simplified contract, where guarantees are only effective at the expiry of the contract.
The return above the guarantee is shared between the company and the customer. In
different countries this profit sharing is regulated by a number of different procedures, ranging
from predetermined sharing rules to full company discretion from year to year (limited only
by competitive pressure). As the market pressure is hard to assess in a theoretical model, we
find it useful letting profit sharing be determined by a set of fixed rules, as in e.g. Briys and
1The Hansen and Hansen (2003) method of continuous optimization of the asset allocation with respect to
the customers’ preferences will typically be unrealistic when the company decides the asset allocation.
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Company Country Year Description Consequences
Executive Life USA 1991 At the end of the 1980s several US
life insurers faced financial distress
due to losses on real estate and junk
bonds. Among the public, this led
to a lack of confidence, causing a
flood of surrenders. Executive Life
had to file for chapter 11 protection
after 1990 surrenders of more than
10 times the levels 4 years earlier.
Administration and run-off of the
portfolio was administrated by the
insurance supervisory authorities of
the state of California and a new
company, Aurura was set up by a
French consortium. Still, policy-
holders who didn’t surrender before
the bankruptcy lost part of their
promised amounts.
Nissan Mutual Life Japan 1997 Nissan Mutual Life collapsed under
the combination of high guarantees
(70% of the liabilities yielded 5.5%)
and low investment yield, due to
both low interest rates and a bear-
ish equity market. It was the first
Japanese life insurer to go bankrupt
after WW2. The equity of company
had likely been negative for several
years.
Around 2/3s of the net losses to
customers were covered by the pol-
icyholder protection program, a
mandatory program for all Japanese
insurers. A run-off-company, Aoba
Life was established, and later
acquired by the French company
Artemis.
Equitable Life UK 2002 The oldest mutual company in the
world went down due to a com-
bination of very high guarantees
and wrong assessments of longevity
risk in pension products. Failure
to meet the guarantees and a lost
court appeal to reduce guarantees
almost caused Equitable to file for
bankruptcy.
Customers faced large losses that
despite complaints against supervi-
sory authorities have not been com-
pensated by the government. The
active part (salesforce etc) of Equi-
table Life was sold to Halifax. In a
compromise deal customers voted in
favor of a rescue operation including
a cut in payments to customers by
appr. 20%.
Mannheimer Germany 2003 In the first default scenario of a Ger-
man insurer for more than 50 years,
Mannheimer had to close acquisi-
tion of new business following large
losses on the equity market after
the millennium bubble. The group’s
non-life business also came under
pressure.
Customers’ claims were saved due
to an issue of new capital by the
Austrian insurer Uniqa who ac-
quired a majority of the shares of
Mannheimer.
Sources: Press clipping, annual reports, and Briys and de Varenne (2001), chapter 3.
Table 1: Overview of large life insurance financial distress situations.
de Varenne (2001). Again, more general versions will be allowing for time-dependent, but
deterministic sharing rules or sharing rules being a function of some stochastic process.
We assume that the capital structure of the company is fixed only at time zero. In line
with Miltersen and Persson (2003) we do not allow for dividend payments, nor any form of
capital issues. The company will default at the time where book equity is negative after
guarantees are met. However, as we describe in section 2, we also show simpler contracts,
where bankruptcy (and guarantees) are only effective at expiry, or where shareholders will
always pick up losses (unlimited responsibility). At that time the customers will take over
all of the company’s assets. Further compensation (rescue operations) from the government
is not included. While in property & casualty insurance there frequently exist government
supported guarantee funds, such funds are rarely seen in life and pension insurance. Practice
shows that such rescue operations can hardly be counted on, as in most of the larger recent
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defaults of life companies, governments have chosen not to intervene (see table 1 for details).
In line with most literature on this topic (e.g. Grosen and Jørgensen (2000), Hansen and
Miltersen (2002), and Miltersen and Persson (2003)) we will not cover pure actuarial risk
elements, like mortality risk, disability risk, longevity risk, etc, or any type of administrative
costs. Neither will we cover any part of the premium set aside to cover such elements, which
means that we assume that the full initial payment from customers go into a form of savings
account.
In order to make sure that all contracts have the same value to the company, we ensure
that pricing is correct by assigning a profit sharing that fits the other parameters. Individuals
are then allowed to choose from the set of correctly priced contracts. As previously explained,
we then use CRRA preferences to evaluate the contracts from the individuals’ perspective.
There has been limited focus on whether L & P contracts are suited to satisfy customers’
welfare. Previous research has focused on pricing life and pension insurance contracts. Only a
few papers have used similar models to analyze welfare effects of guaranteed products. Bren-
nan (1993) elaborates on the classical point made by Borch (1962) that guaranteed products
will lead to a welfare loss, but without quantifying the effect further. Jensen and Sørensen
(2001), and Consiglio, Saunders, and Zenios (2006) builds on this point by quantifying the
effects in various cases of life-time interest rate guarantees. We elaborate further the welfare
effects of different contract design. To our knowledge, no one has previous investigated the
value of contract design in a behavioral framework.
Our paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the different features of our
model. The numerical examples in section 3 illustrate the efficiency loss of the different
components of the contract. Section 4 consists of the same analyzes as section 3 except that
we use Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) instead of standard expected utility. Finally we
conclude.
2 The Model
We assume a standard no-arbitrage economy with two assets, a risk free bank account, Dt
and a risky equity index, St. The dynamics of the asset classes are given by:
dDt = rDtdt, D0 = d (1)
dSt = µStdt+ σStdZt, S0 = s (2)
where r is the constant risk-free interest rate, µ is the constant expected return on the equity
index, σ is the constant volatility of the equity index, and Zt is a standard Brownian motion.
A proportion θt is invested in the equity index. We will assume that the proportion of the
equity index is fixed, i.e. that θt = θ. The dynamics of the total asset portfolio At under the
real probability measure P is then given by
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dAt = (rAt + θ(µ− r)At)dt+ θAtσdZt, A0 = a. (3)
Design of ”fair contracts” is done under the equivalent martingale measure Q (Harrison
and Kreps, 1979), given by
dAt = rAtdt+ θAtσdZ
Q
t , A0 = a (4)
where ZQt is the standard Brownian motion under Q.
Saving Vehicles
Assets Liabilities
E0 = αA0
A0 B0 = 0
L0 = (1− α)A0
The table shows the balance sheet of the insurer at the start of the contract.
Table 2: Balance sheet at time t = 0
We describe the following alternative saving vehicles:
1. The customers directly choose the asset allocation, i.e. Merton’s problem (Merton,
1971).
2. The customer return has a floor similar to a put option, e.g. index-linked bonds.
3. The customer return has a floor, however face the risk of the company defaulting, e.g.
the simple life insurance problem of Briys and de Varenne (1994).
4. The guarantees embedded in the product are realized on an annual basis, i.e. annual
guarantees.
The liability side of the insurer’s balance sheet consists of Et being the equity of the
company, Lt being the reserves (customers’ funds) and Bt being the bonus account (to be
further described in section 2.4). In the Merton problem (1 above) we define Et = 0 and
Bt = 0 for all t and in the cases of index-linked bonds and simple life insurance (2 and 3
above) we define Bt = 0 for all t.
The initial balance sheet of the insurer (at time t = 0) is shown in table 2, where α is
defined as the proportion of equity to total assets at time t = 0.
2.1 The Merton Problem
The Merton problem is the one of an individual investor who make direct investments in the
two assets described above. We formulate the problem definition
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max
θ
U = max
θ
E(u(LT )) (5)
where u is the customer’s utility function, with the usual assumptions that u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0.
Under CPT the U-function will be replaced with a V-function to be defined section 4.1.
2.2 Index-linked Bonds
In the index-linked bond contract the customer has an absolute guarantee on receiving a
promised amount at the expiry of the contract. If the assets in the company is insufficient
to cover the guarantee, the customer has the right to extract the missing amount from the
owners of the company. This is close to the type of situation faced by single companies or
products in a larger group setting, e.g. index-linked bonds as part of a wide menu of products
in a financial conglomerate.
At date zero the company receives an initial amount of assets A0 which they invest in a risk
free asset (bank account - D) and a equity index (S). The investment comes from customers,
providing an amount L0, and owners, providing an amount E0. The ratio of capital provided
by owners (E0/A0) is noted (1− α).
At the payout date T, the assets of the company are split according to the following rules:
1. The customer has a claim of his initial investment capitalized by a guaranteed rate g,
in total amounting to L0e
gT .
2. The owner has a second priority claim of his proportion (1 − α) of the total assets at
time T , amounting to (1− α)AT .
3. The remaining profit is split with a proportion δ to the customer and (1 − δ) to the
owners.
The payout structure is illustrated in the forthcoming figure 2. Rearranged and formalized
L0 = αA0 (6)
LT =
{
L0e
gT if AT <
1
αL0e
gT
L0e
gT + αδ(AT − 1αL0egT ) if AT ≥ 1αL0egT .
We search for ”fair contracts”, i.e. solutions where
L0 = αA0 = e
−rTEQ(LT ) (7)
where
LT = L0e
gT + αδ(AT −
1
α
L0e
gT )+ (8)
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or, equivalently
E0 = (1− α)A0 = e−rTEQ(AT − LT ) (9)
where AT − LT = ET = AT − L0egT − αδ(AT − 1αL0egT )+.
Following Black and Scholes (1973) we can define date t market value Mt(LT ) of the
customers contract:
Mt(LT ) =Mt[L0e
gT + αδ(AT −
1
α
L0e
gT )+]
= L0e
gT e−r(T−t) + αδ(AtN(d1)−
1
α
L0e
gT e−r(T−t)N(d2)),
(10)
where
d1 =
(r − g + σ2A/2)(T − t)
σA
√
(T − t)
, d2 = d1 − σA
√
(T − t),
σA = θσ,
(11)
and,
N(d) =
∫ d
−∞
1√
2pi
e−x
2/2dx. (12)
Delta, δ
In our model we assume all parameters are set at time 0, therefore no time index on the
control variables g, θ, and α. We let δ be the residual parameter that makes the contract fair,
thus solve equation (10) at time t = 0 with respect to δ:
δ =
1− egT e−rT
N(d1)− egT e−rTN(d2)
. (13)
We find that δ is independent of L0, α and A0.
Effective theta, Θt
The effective proportion of the customers’ wealth held in the equity index at time t, Θt, is
given by:
Θt ≡
∂Lt
∂St
Lt
=
θAtαδN(d1)
L0egT e−r(T−t) + αδ(AtN(d1)− 1αL0egT e−r(T−t)N(d2))
.
(14)
The exposure, Θt, vary over time and as a function of wealth. Hence a fixed equity
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index exposure cannot be achieved by an index-linked bond contract with fixed parameters.
However, in the numerical results we will show that the effective theta, Θt, is closer than the
company’s asset allocation (θ) to the asset allocation of the Merton solution.
The date 0 effective theta, Θ0 is given by:
Θ0 =
∂L0
∂S0
L0
=
θδN(d1)
egT e−rT + δ(N(d1)− egT e−rTN(d2))
.
(15)
The date 0 exposure, Θ0, is independent of L0, α and A0.
Maximization Problem
Rearranging equation (8)
LT =
{
L0e
gT if AT < A0e
gT
L0e
gT + δL0(e
rˆT − egT ) if AT ≥ A0egT
where rˆ = ln(AT /(T ∗A0) is the realized return on the investment portfolio. The problem is
now independent of α. Due to the assumption that owners’ capital is callable, even if outside
the company, a high α is not required in order to secure the guaranteed amounts to customers
and hence α is redundant. The maximization problem can be formulated as:
max
θ,g
E(u(LT )) (16)
subject to the restrictions above and the restriction that the contracts are fair, i.e. that
e−rTEQ(AT − LT ) = E0. (17)
We solve this problem numerically, see appendix A for further details.
2.3 Simple Life Insurance
Contrary to the previous section, the simple life contract allows the company to default
without any obligation for the owners to insert more capital. This is typical for a public
company where life insurance is the main or only business. This type of contract was first
described by Briys and de Varenne (1994). At the payout date T, the assets of the company
are split according to the following rules:
1. The customer has a claim of his initial investment capitalized by a guaranteed rate g,
in total amounting to L0e
gT .
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The figure illustrates payoff patterns of different contracts at time T. Customer reserve (LT ) versus value of
company (AT ).
Figure 2: Payoff patterns
2. The owner has a second priority claim of his proportion (1 − α) of the total assets at
time T , amounting to (1− α)AT .
3. The remaining profit is split with a proportion δ to the customer and (1 − δ) to the
owners.
In figure 2 we give a comparison of the form of LT as a function ofAT for the three contracts
given (Merton problem, index-linked bonds, and simple life). Rearranged and formalized
L0 = αA0 (18)
LT =


AT if AT ≤ L0egT
L0e
gT if L0e
gT ≤ AT ≤ 1αL0egT
L0e
gT + δ(αAT − L0egT ) if AT ≥ 1αL0egT
We search for solutions where
L0 = αA0 = e
−rTEQ(LT ) (19)
where
LT = AT − (AT − L0egT )+ + αδ(AT −
1
α
L0e
gT )+. (20)
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Following Black and Scholes (1973) we can again define date t market value Mt(LT ) of
the customers contract:
Mt(LT ) =Mt[L0e
gT − (L0egT −AT )+ + αδ(AT −
1
α
L0e
gT )+]
= L0e
gT e−r(T−t)N(d′2) +At(1−N(d′1)) + αδ(AtN(d1)−
1
α
L0e
gT e−r(T−t)N(d2))
(21)
where
d1 =
(r − g + σ2A/2)(T − t)
σA
√
(T − t)
, d2 = d1 − σA
√
(T − t)
d′1 = d1 −
lnα
σA
√
(T − t)
, d′2 = d
′
1 − σA
√
(T − t)
σA = θσ
(22)
Delta, δ
We let δ be the residual parameter that makes the contract fair, thus solve equation (21) at
time t = 0 with respect to δ:
δ =
α− αegT e−r(T−t)N(d′2)− 1 +N(d′1)
α(N(d1)− egT e−r(T−t)N(d2))
(23)
where δ is independent of L0 and A0.
Effective theta, Θt
The effective proportion of the customers’s wealth held in the equity index at time t, Θt, is
given by:
Θt =
θAt[1−N(d′1) + αδN(d1)]
L0egT e−r(T−t)N(d′2) +At(1−N(d′1)) + αδ(AtN(d1)− 1αL0egT e−r(T−t)N(d2))
. (24)
The proportion, Θt, vary over time and as a function of wealth. Hence a fixed equity index
exposure cannot be achieved by a life insurance contract with fixed parameters.
Date 0 effective theta, Θ0:
Θ0 =
θ[1−N(d′1) + αδN(d1)]
αegT e−rTN(d′2) + 1−N(d′1) + αδ(N(d1)− egT e−rTN(d2))
. (25)
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In this case, Θ0 is independent of L0 and A0.
Maximization Problem
The problem can now be formulated as follows:
max
α,θ,g
E(u(LT )) (26)
subject to the restriction that the contracts are fair. We solve this problem numerically, see
appendix A for further details.
2.4 Annual Guarantees
As mentioned in the introduction, the existence of annual guarantees calls for a different
treatment of contracts. We solve this by doing year-by-year-simulations and by declaring
bankruptcy if book equity at the end of year turns out to be negative. In addition, bonuses
are calculated at the end of each year and credited to the reserve. However, in order to keep
the model as simple as possible, we do not allow for the company neither to pay dividends
nor to issue new equity. Neither do we allow companies to run at negative equity for a period
of time, even though this is commonly seen in practice.2
Annual dynamics of the contracts are performed in a similar way as in section 2.3 with
the exception of the bankruptcy possibility which also have consequences for coming years:
L0 = αA0 E0 = (1− α)A0 (27)
Lt =


At if At ≤ Lt−1eg
Lt−1e
g if Lt−1e
g ≤ At ≤ 1αLt−1eg
Lt−1e
g + δα(At − Lt−1eg) if At ≥ 1αLt−1eg
Et = At − Lt. (28)
In the case of a bankruptcy, customers will receive the full value of the company’s assets (we
assume no bankruptcy costs). We assume this is invested in the risk free asset, such that:
ET = 0
LT = Aτe
r(T−τ)
(29)
where τ is the (stochastic) time of bankruptcy. The assumption that investments after
bankruptcy is done solely in the risk free asset may give a penalty that is unrealistic. However,
our assumption of no bankruptcy costs will (at least partly) offset this.
2See Briys and de Varenne (2001), page 59 for anecdotal evidence.
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The Bonus Reserve
The figure illustrates how return is split between different types of capital. The first part of the return
(guarantee) is allocated to the customer reserve, then a part is allocated to equity, while return above is split
between customer reserve, bonus reserve, and equity.
Figure 3: Contract design
In order to provide buffers for companies to meet bad years in the security markets,
regulators in most countries allow for (and to a certain extent require) the build up of buffers
of capital that are yet to be allocated to customers’ reserves. These buffers have different
forms, importance and names from country to country, e.g. bonus reserves, value adjustment
reserves, unrealized gains (reserves), fund for future appropriations, etc. We name them bonus
reserves, Bt. Bonus reserves can be used if the achieved return is not sufficient of covering
guaranteed returns.
Allocation to bonus reserves in practice are done in a number of ways, e.g. through
allocating a proportion of bonuses each year, allocating unrealized gains on various types of
securities, increasing the funds in the same rate as the other reserves, bringing the bonus
reserve to a target level, etc. We shall use a simple allocation mechanism similar to the
method described by Miltersen and Persson (2003). More sophisticated methods exist, see
e.g. Grosen and Jørgensen (2000) where allocations to the bonus reserves are also a function
of a given target level (relative to reserves). However, for our purpose the gain of using such
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methods is limited.
In our model we credit the bonus reserves by a proportion of declared bonuses, b. Figure 3
illustrates the allocation rules. The bottom part of the return covers the guaranteed amount.
If returns exceeds the level of the guarantee, an amount will be used to cover a similar return
on shareholders’ capital. Then, if there still is something left, the remaining return will be
split proportionally between equity, reserves, and bonus reserves.
Mathematically we can now show that:
L0 = αA0
E0 = (1− α)A0
B0 = 0
(30)
Lt =


At if At ≤ Lt−1eg
Lt−1e
g if Lt−1e
g < At ≤ Lt−1eg + Et−1eg +Bt−1
Lt−1e
g + δα(1− b)(At − (Lt−1eg + Et−1eg +Bt−1)) if At > Lt−1eg + Et−1eg +Bt−1
Bt =


0 if At ≤ Lt−1eg + Et−1
At − Lt−1eg − Et−1 if Lt−1eg + Et−1 < At ≤ Lt−1eg + Et−1 +Bt−1
Bt−1 if Lt−1e
g + Et−1 +Bt−1 < At ≤ Lt−1eg + Et−1eg +Bt−1
Bt−1 + δαb(At − (Lt−1eg + Et−1eg +Bt−1)) if At > Lt−1eg + Et−1eg +Bt−1
Et = At − Lt −Bt. (31)
In case of bankruptcy (At < Lt−1e
g)
ET = 0
BT = 0
LT = Aτe
r(T−τ)
(32)
where τ is the (stochastic) time of bankruptcy.
For annual guarantees, with or without bonus reserves, closed form solutions are unavail-
able, and we have to rely on numerical solutions by simulation. However, including the bonus
reserve, we use the same problem definition as in section 2.3, namely:
max
α,θ,g,b
E(u(LT +BT )) (33)
subject to the restriction that the contracts are fair. We solve this problem numerically, see
appendix A for further details.
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3 Results with Expected Utility
3.1 Power Utility
Within the expected utility framework, we assume that the customer’s utility belongs to the
class of CRRA utility functions with a relative risk aversion coefficient γ. Then the utility
can be described as a power utility function on the form
u(x) =
1
1− γ x
1−γ . (34)
3.2 Parameters
In the example we use the following parameters:
A0 = 5 r = 0.04
µ = 0.065 σ = 0.15
T = 5 γ = 3
b = 0.2
3.3 The Merton Problem
The standard asset allocation problem, solved by Merton (1971), is to place a share equal to
θ =
µ− r
γσ2
(35)
in the equity index. Given our parameters, the allocation to the equity index is θ = 37%. We
test the numerical algorithm by finding exactly the same answer as in the analytical solution.
3.4 Index-linked Bonds
Guarantee Optimal Effective Mean return
g θ0 δ theta Θ0 rA
0.0 % 37 % 0.984 35 % 4.65 %
0.5 % 37 % 0.972 34 % 4.63 %
1.0 % 38 % 0.947 32 % 4.61 %
1.5 % 40 % 0.900 31 % 4.58 %
2.0 % 42 % 0.824 27 % 4.53 %
2.5 % 47 % 0.684 23 % 4.45 %
3.0 % 70 % 0.399 18 % 4.35 %
Table 3: Overview Index-linked Bonds
We are free to choose the parameters α, δ, θ, g. To find the set of parameters that gives
fair contracts, we assign reasonable values to α, θ, g, and let δ be a residual. We optimize over
the set of allowable parameters.
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Figure 4: Optimal contract of index-linked bonds as a function of asset allocation, θ, and
guarantee, g, with α = 0.9
In figure 4 allocation to the equity index is shown on the x-axis, and annual guaranteed rate
on the y-axis. We find that optimal θ given g converges to the Merton solution for decreasing
guarantees. This is of course due to fact that when the effect of guarantees disappear we are
back to the Merton problem.3 At that point the expected utility will also converge to the
level of the Merton solution. A higher guarantee will increase the flat area of the LT (AT )
(see figure 2) where the customer face no risk when t approaches T.
Further details on this problem is given in table 3. While the optimal θ increases with
the level of g, the effective exposure to the equity index, Θ0, decreases. Due to the non-linear
time-variance of θ, customers are reluctant to have a high Θ0, as the utility loss from this
parameter increasing over time may be large.
3.5 Simple Life Insurance
The results of the simple life problem are given in figure 5. Again, we find that optimal θ and
corresponding expected utility approaches the Merton for low guarantees. For a high g, asset
values in the ”flat area” of LT (AT ) (see figure 2) when t is approaching T is more likely. This
is undesirable, as in this area stock market exposure approaches zero. However, the level of
guarantees does not seem to matter a lot relative to the importance of asset allocation.
For a given θ higher than 37%, however, we find that a guarantee is optimal. This is due to
the Θ0s shown in table 4, which now are expected to be optimal close to the Merton solution
because of the symmetric upside and downside of the contracts (as illustrated in figure 2).
For a θ higher than 37%, a way of reducing stock market exposure consists of introducing a
3Theoretically this only happens when g = −∞.
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Figure 5: Optimal contract of simple life insurance as a function of asset allocation, θ, and
guarantee, g, with α = 0.9
Guarantee Optimal Effective Mean return Prob of Average loss given
g θ0 δ theta Θ0 rA default p(d) default lgd of L0
0.0 % 37 % 0.989 35 % 4.65 % 0.3 % 3.8 %
0.5 % 39 % 0.971 36 % 4.66 % 0.8 % 4.4 %
1.0 % 42 % 0.944 36 % 4.67 % 1.9 % 5.3 %
1.5 % 45 % 0.904 36 % 4.68 % 3.7 % 6.1 %
2.0 % 48 % 0.850 36 % 4.67 % 6.3 % 7.2 %
2.5 % 52 % 0.780 36 % 4.67 % 9.7 % 8.8 %
3.0 % 55 % 0.700 36 % 4.65 % 13.4 % 10.1 %
Table 4: Overview Simple Life
guaranteed return.
Defaults in the simple life problem will always take place in the last period. Of course, both
the probability and severity of defaults increase with g. The default probabilities, particularly
for high g’s, seem high, compared to the market focus on the solidity of the life insurance
companies.
3.6 Annual Guarantees
In figure 6 we plot the expected utility for the annual guarantee case. We find that optimal θ
is increasing in guarantees as for the simple life alternative. But optimal θ is higher, e.g. for
g = 2% optimal θ = 58%, versus 48% for simple life. Possible explanations for this include
compensation for early defaults (when all assets are invested risk-free) and/or the fact that
the bonus reserve serve as a smoothing mechanism. For low guarantees we still approach the
Merton solution.
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Figure 6: Optimal contract of annual guarantees as a function of asset allocation, θ, and
guarantee, g, with α = 0.9 and b = 0.2
Guarantee Optimal Mean return Prob of Average loss given
g θ b δ r
A
default p(d) default lgd of L0
0.0 % 43 % 20 % 0.851 4.56 % 6 % 2.7 %
0.5 % 46 % 20 % 0.793 4.53 % 9 % 2.9 %
1.0 % 48 % 20 % 0.731 4.49 % 13 % 3.4 %
1.5 % 55 % 20 % 0.640 4.48 % 21 % 4.0 %
2.0 % 58 % 20 % 0.565 4.45 % 26 % 4.6 %
2.5 % 63 % 20 % 0.484 4.43 % 32 % 5.3 %
3.0 % 68 % 20 % 0.408 4.41 % 37 % 5.9 %
Table 5: Overview Annual Guarantees
The penalty for larger guarantees is significantly larger than in the simple life case. With
annual guarantees a higher guarantee means a higher probability of default at a time τ < T ,
when all assets again are invested unfavorably in the risk-free asset. This must be weighted
against the requirement of compensate low δs with high θs to get an optimal exposure to the
stock market. In the high guarantee scenarios this trade-off turns out to be difficult to make,
causing a utility loss even for an optimal θ.
Default probabilities given in table 5 are now accumulated over t = 0, . . . , T . Probabilities
are higher than for simple life due to the possibility of bankruptcy before expiry. However,
the average loss in the case of default is now lower, as losses are not allowed to accumulate.
Again, comparing to the real world the probabilities of default seem high. However, one should
take into account that θs are much higher than the 15 − 20% commonly seen in continental
European life insurers.
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3.7 Comparison
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Figure 7: Optimal asset allocation under expected utility, given α = 0.9, g = 0.02, and
b = 0.2.
The results for a fixed g = 2% are given in figure 7. Highest utility is as previously noted
offered by the Merton solution for a θ = 37%. The simple life contract is close to the Merton
solution, but with a higher optimal θ. Index-linked bond has a lower optimum due to the
previously identified problems with Θt changing significantly over time. However, for large
θs this contract preforms best, as the guarantee makes sure there is no downside risk.
The contract with yearly guarantees does not perform as well as the other contract due
to the problems of balancing the need for a high θ against the problem of having too large
likelihood of default. However, for a high θ, it touches the simple life contract, possibly
because the bonus reserve serves as a smoothing mechanism.
For low θs all contracts are performing at the same level, due to the fact that guarantees
are never effective. Of the same reason, the level of g will have limited impact in this area,
as long as g is significantly lower than r.
Welfare calculations are done in the form of expected utility. To better compare the
different cases we define the certainty equivalent (CEQ):
u(CEQ) = E[u(LT )]. (36)
We can interpret CEQ as the amount of wealth to be received at the horizon with certainty
that would give the customer the same expected utility as he receives under the other strate-
gies. For the power utility function CEQ is given by
CEQ = [E[u(LT )](1− γ)]
1
1−γ . (37)
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Figure 8: Development of certainty equivalents under expected utility, as contracts become
more sophisticated, given α = 0.9, g = 0.02, and b = 0.2.
Figure 8 shows the certainty equivalent of different types of contracts. It is similar to
figure 7 but only compares results for optimal θs for each contract type. We include a second
type of annual guarantee contract, without a bonus reserve. The impact of the bonus reserve
seems to be limited, but positive as utility increases with b. The overall picture, even though
annual guarantees clearly weaken the contract, is that effects are rather small (< 1% of the
initial amount).
4 Results with Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT)
4.1 Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT)
In section 3 we found that life and pension insurance products are not optimal within the
standard expected utility framework. Why do customers still buy these products? One rea-
son may be that the expected utility function does not describe the preferences of customers.
Expected utility maximization is a description of how rational households should choose, its
descriptive accuracy has come under attack as experimental psychologists have demonstrated
that households systematically deviate from the choice predictions that it implies. Several
alternative behavioral models of human choice have been proposed. The most fully developed
and thoroughly investigated so far is Tversky and Kahneman (1992)’s Cumulative Prospect
Theory (CPT). It is a descriptive theory, based on experimental evidence, of how people eval-
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uate risk. CPT combines the concepts of loss aversion (LA) and a nonlinear rank-dependent
weighting of probability assessments.
CPT has two principal components. First, the individuals are not taking absolute levels of
wealth into account, but rather, gains and losses measured relative to a reference point. There
is a value function defined over gains, similar to the utility function in expected utility. Over
losses there is a loss aversion function that transforms the specific finding that individuals
are much more sensitive to losses than to gains of the same magnitude. Here λ > 1 describes
how much more sensitive an individual is to a loss relative to a gain. The LA function
allows individuals to be risk averse over gains but risk seeking over losses, and for losses to
matter more than gains. This is described by an S-shaped utility function. The sensitivity
to increasing gains or losses is measured by φ. Finally, there is a weighting function used to
transform probability distributions into a function where individuals put more emphasis on
extreme outcomes.
Cumulative prospect theory treats gains and losses separately. We define surplus wealth
as current wealth relative to a reference point, Γ. The initial amount invested is frequently
refered to as a good reference point. We define Γ = L0e
ρT and let ρ be a parameter we can
freely choose.
Assume a gamble is composed of m + n + 1 outcomes, LT,−m < . . . < Γ < . . . < LT,n,
which occur with probabilities p−m, . . . , pn, respectively. The corresponding gamble can be
denoted by the pair (L, p), where L = (LT,−m, . . . , LT,n) and p = (p−m, . . . , pn). We define
V +(L; p) = w(pn)u(LT,n) +
n∑
k=1

w( k∑
j=0
pn−j)− w(
k−1∑
j=0
pn−j)

u(LT,n−k), (38)
and
V −(L; p) = w(p−m)u(LT,−m) +
m∑
k=1

w( k∑
j=0
p−(m−j))− w(
k−1∑
j=0
p−(m−j))

u(LT,−(m−k)). (39)
The preference value of the gamble (L, p) is given by
V (L; p) = V +(L; p) + V −(L; p) (40)
where V +(L; p) measures contribution of gains, and V −(L; p) the contribution of losses. The
function w(p) is a probability weighting function assumed to be increasing from w(0) = 0
until w(1) = 1. Prelec (1998) offers a single parameter version of the weighting function:
w(p) = e−(− ln p)
ϕ
(41)
where ϕ is a ”free” parameter. Prelec (1998)’s weighting function is almost identical to
Tversky and Kahneman’s weighting function. The key difference is that Prelec’s specification
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is based on behavioral axioms rather than the convenience of the functional form. We note
that with with ϕ = 1, w(p) degenerates to w(p) = p. Hence, we are back to the expected
utility framework with a non-standard utility function. We will later use this as a special
case, see section 4.8.
Finally, the utility function is defined as follows:
u(LT ) =
{
uG(LT ) = (LT − Γ)φ LT ≥ Γ
λuL(LT ) = −λ(Γ− LT )φ LT < Γ
(42)
4.2 Parameters
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Figure 9: Optimal contract of index-linked bonds under CPT as a function of asset allocation
θ and guarantee, g, with α = 0.9
Basecase
L0 = 4.75 r = 0.04
µ = 0.065 σ = 0.15
T = 5 b = 0.2
ρ = 0 α = 0.90
λ = 2.25 φ = 0.5
ϕ = 0.75
Estimates of the parameters of CPT can be found in several studies. A challenge for CPT
is to move the empirical estimates from experimental data to real world choice scenarios.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated φ = 0.88, λ = 2.25, ϕgain = 0.75, and ϕloss = 0.69,
but they used the parameter ϕ for a slightly different weighting function than we use. Camerer
and Ho (1994) estimates φ = 0.32 and ϕ = 0.56. Wu and Gonzalez (1996) also estimate the
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Figure 10: Optimal contract of simple life insurance under CPT as a function of asset alloca-
tion θ and guarantee, g, with α = 0.9
Prelec’s weighting function yielding φ = 0.48 and ϕ = 0.72. Based on all these different studies
we assign the following figures to our free parameters: φ = 0.5, ϕ = 0.75, and λ = 2.25. With
ρ equal 0 the reference point is equal initial invested amount, Γ = L0.
4.3 The Merton Problem
Even though there is done some work with optimal portfolio choice and loss aversion,4 not
much is done with portfolio choice and CPT. Davies and Satchell (2005) investigate closed-
form solutions with strict assumptions on the asset process. In our simulation world we can
easily solve the standard portfolio choice problem numerically. As shown in figure 12, the
optimal allocation to the equity index is about 18% for our basecase. In the same figure we
also plot the value for a 2% guarantee of the index-linked bond case and the simple life case.
The value is higher for the index-linked bond contract than for Mertons problem. Thus, the
customer is better of with a fair priced index-linked bond than just a portfolio consisting of
a combination of bonds and an equity index.
4.4 Index-linked Bonds
We plot the value for the index-linked bonds case in figure 9. On the x-axis the allocation
to the equity index is plotted, and the annual guaranteed rate is on the y-axis. We find that
optimal θ increases for increasing guarantee. Also opposite to the standard utility problem
we find that having a guarantee is better than not having.
4See Gomes (2005) and Berkelaar, Kouwenberg, and Post (2003).
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Figure 11: Optimal contract with annual guarantees under CPT as a function of asset allo-
cation θ and guarantee, g, with α = 0.9 and b = 0.2
Guarantee Optimal Effective Mean return
g θ0 δ theta Θ0 rA
0.0 % 0.2 1.000 20 % 4.37 %
0.5 % 0.7 0.841 48 % 4.85 %
1.0 % 0.7 0.792 44 % 4.78 %
1.5 % 0.7 0.727 38 % 4.70 %
2.0 % 0.7 0.644 33 % 4.61 %
2.5 % 0.7 0.537 26 % 4.49 %
3.0 % 0.7 0.399 18 % 4.35 %
Table 6: Overview Index-linked Bonds
For guarantees equal or below zero we obtain an inner optimal guarantee. For higher
guarantees we find that the customer seeks as large θ as possible. The reason for this change
is due to the level of the reference point which is equal to a guarantee of zero per cent.
4.5 Simple Life Insurance
In figure 10 we plot the value for the simple life case. The optimal guarantee is about
g = 2.5%, with a corresponding optimal θ of 28%. For g = 0%, the optimal θ is about 20%.
For increasing g, θ increases with a maximum θ = 29% for g = 2.0%. We observe in general
that θ is lower than the corresponding scenarios with expected utility. This is due to the
aversion for bankruptcies. Table 7 shows that bankruptcy risk is now rather low.
Similarly to the index-linked bond, a guarantee of zero per cent is clearly unfavorable, as
we then touch the reference point of the utility function.
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Figure 12: Optimal asset allocation under cumulative prospect theory, given α = 0.9, g = 0.02,
and b = 0.2.
Guarantee Optimal Effective Mean return Prob of Average loss given
g θ0 δ theta Θ0 rA default p(d) default lgd of L0
0.0 % 0.2 1.000 20 % 4.37 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
0.5 % 0.25 0.996 25 % 4.46 % 0.0 % 1.9 %
1.0 % 0.28 0.984 26 % 4.50 % 0.1 % 2.9 %
1.5 % 0.29 0.963 26 % 4.49 % 0.4 % 3.4 %
2.0 % 0.29 0.928 24 % 4.45 % 0.9 % 3.6 %
2.5 % 0.28 0.872 21 % 4.39 % 1.4 % 3.6 %
3.0 % 0.25 0.783 16 % 4.29 % 1.6 % 3.4 %
Table 7: Overview Simple Life
4.6 Annual Guarantees
Figure 11 shows the value for the annual guarantee case. The optimal θ is about 32% inde-
pendent of the guarantee. Again the guarantee has an inner optimum, at about 1%. The
penalty for being close to the breakpoint is now less severe, as hitting the guarantee one year
can be off-set by higher returns in other years.
On the other hand, there seems to be a bankruptcy penalty on high guarantees not unlike
the effect we found with standard expected utility (see section 3). However, table 8 shows
that the cumulative probability of bankruptcy is high. Compared to the simple life case,
bankruptcies are not as dramatic, as the magnitude is lower, and as part of the loss can be
off-set by investing risk-free, to bring the total return above the reference point (0% return).
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Guarantee Optimal Mean return Prob of Average loss given
g θ0 b δ rA default p(d) default lgd of L0
0.0 % 0.33 0.2 0.915 4.49 % 1 % 1.7 %
0.5 % 0.33 0.2 0.882 4.45 % 2 % 1.9 %
1.0 % 0.34 0.2 0.829 4.42 % 3 % 2.1 %
1.5 % 0.35 0.2 0.761 4.38 % 5 % 2.3 %
2.0 % 0.33 0.2 0.701 4.31 % 5 % 2.3 %
2.5 % 0.36 0.2 0.576 4.27 % 10 % 2.7 %
3.0 % 0.36 0.2 0.452 4.20 % 13 % 2.7 %
Table 8: Overview Annual Guarantees
4.7 Comparison
In figure 12 we found that guarantees are not effective for low θs. For higher θs the probability
of large bankruptcies is the dominant feature of the contracts. This means that the index-
linked bonds (with no bankruptcies) performs the best, while the limited losses of yearly
guarantees also do fairly well. In the optimal θ, however, simple life outperforms the yearly
guarantees, as losses are moderate and ”unnecessary bankruptcies” should be avoided.
To better compare the different cases we also for CPT define the certainty equivalent
(CEQ) in a similar way as section in 3.7:
V (CEQ) = V (L; p). (43)
For the loss aversion function CEQ is given by
CEQ =


Γ + [V (L; p)]
1
φ LT ≥ Γ
Γ−
[
−V (L;p)
λ
] 1
φ
LT < Γ
(44)
The figures show that all realizations of value are positive, thus LT ≥ Γ. Figure 13 shows
the CEQ for the different contracts. Opposite to the situation with standard expected utility,
the index-linked bonds contract gives highest value. Hence, for the customer under CPT, the
effect of combining no bankruptcies (losses) with the opportunity of taking high risk if E(LT )
is high, is highly appreciated.
4.8 The Non-standard Expected Utility Case
CPT is based on experimental evidence and clearly outside of the expected utility framework.
However, we can rationalize the guarantees within expected utility, but with a non-standard
utility function. By using the special case ϕ = 1 in equation (41), and the loss-aversion utility
function from equation (42), we are still within the expected utility framework. The results
are similar to the result from section 4.6. We still get an internal optimum, but the optimal
annual guarantee is now slightly below 0%. The full results with annual guarantees are shown
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Figure 13: Development of certainty equivalents under cumulative prospect theory, as con-
tracts become more sophisticated, given α = 0.9, g = 0.02, and b = 0.2.
in figure 14. Similarly, the other types of contracts give results in the same fashion as what
is shown in sections 4.3-4.5, but with slightly different optima.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a framework for optimizing pension insurance design by combining pricing
principles with utility theory. Not surprisingly is the Merton solution optimal with standard
expected utility. The design of the contracts is a less important factor than stock market
participation in itself.
With CPT index-linked bonds outperform the other alternatives. Contracts including
both insurance against losses and stock market participation tend to give high expected
utility. The contract design is now more important than the decision whether to participate
in the stock market or not. In both cases annual guarantee contracts are outperformed by
simpler products.
All in all we can not explain the large demand for structured products in the world of
standard expected utility. A possible explanation may be that the customers have CPT
preferences. However, potentially important features of the contracts, such as transaction
costs, taxes, and actuarial elements are left for further research. Furthermore, more sophis-
ticated models may include other sources of revenues, such as labor income or revenues from
alternative pension system(s).
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Figure 14: Optimal contract with annual guarantees with loss-aversion (within expected
utility framework) as a function of asset allocation θ and guarantee, g, with α = 0.9 and
b = 0.2
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Appendix A: Numerical Methods
Both the pricing of the contracts and the computation of the expected utility is based on
standard Monte Carlo techniques. For every alternative we calculate a multi-dimensional
grid of different contracts. For all alternatives except annual guarantees, there exists a closed-
from solution to find fair contracts. To be able to find fair δ for the latter case, we simulate
m = 100000 paths of the value of equity under the risk-neutral measure, Q, (see e.g. equation
(17)). Since the value of equity is monotonic decreasing in δ, we can utilize Newton’s method
to find a fair δ for each contract.
For the set of fair contracts we use the same m runs, but under the real measure P , to
calculate expected utility for both the power utility and CPT. Optimal expected utility for
power utility is given by
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U∗ = max
α,θ,g,b
1
m
m∑
i=1
u(Li,T +Bi,T ) (45)
and in the case of CPT,
U∗ = max
α,θ,g,b
V (Li,T +Bi,T ). (46)
30
